8.2 Suits Against Public Officials in Their Individual Capacity

A.J.
1. ...NOW WRAP YOUR MIND AROUND THAT...
  1. This mind map was created 03.07.2012 by Lisa Stinocher O'Hanlon using XMind software. http://www.xmind.net/share/hennalady/ http://angryjeweler.wix.com/write
    1. 8.2 Suits Against Public Officials in Their Individual Capacity.odt
      1. 8.2 SUITS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS.pdf
      2. http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/46
Eleventh Amendment limits official capacity claims against state officials to prospective injunctive relief,
1. does not affect damage claims against those officials in their individual capacity .
  1. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 , 29-30 (1991 ); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 41 6 U.S. 232, 237 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 1 83 (1 984).
    1. Section 1983 imposes liability without defense on state and local officials who, acting under color of law in their individual capacity , deprive plaintiffs of rights created by the Constitution and federal law.
CAPACITY
QUESTION? IS ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY A JUDICIAL CAPACITY?
1. QUASI-ADMINISTRATIVE
2. QUASI-JUDICIAL
3. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
CONFLICT OF INTEREST?
COURT IS INDEPENDENT BUSINESS;
1. OWNED & OPERATED BY COUNTY OF
STRATEGY ISSUES
STUMP STANDARD
1. All circuits interpret Stump and Bradley to require a clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction in order to lose immunity ; a judge who has subject matter jurisdiction but acts without personal jurisdiction still enjoys absolute immunity for judicial acts. Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 84-86 (2d Cir. 2009) (apply ing Connecticut law in diversity case, which is the same as federal law, finds absolute immunity in case ordinarily in judge's jurisdiction, but in which he had no personal jurisdiction due to his failure to comply with conservatorship statute); Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767 , 7 7 3 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1990); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1 986) (en banc), overruling Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981 ).
  1. So does a judge who issues a contempt order after having been disqualified by the filing of a disqualification affidavit. Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 606-07 (6th Cir. 2001 ).
    1. A judge whose subject matter jurisdiction to issue arrest warrants was limited to crimes committed within his judicial district lost judicial immunity when he signed an arrest warrant based on a complaint of criminal conduct which he knew occurred outside his territorial jurisdiction. Not only did he exceed his jurisdiction, but also he acted in the complete absence of subject matter jurisdiction. Maestri v. Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1988).
The courts of appeal have unanimously held that judges who sit on courts of limited rather than general jurisdiction also enjoy absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts not taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2000) (collecting cases); see Dixon v. Clem, 492 F.3d 665, 67 4-75 (6th Cir. 2007 ) (hearing officer absolutely immune).
WHICH IS THE ADMINISTRATION
1. Administrative adjudication can give rise to absolute judicial immunity, sometimes termed quasi-judicial immunity, when the administrative adjudicator performs a judicial function in proceedings sufficiently judicial in character. In contrast, a judge's administrative decisions are sometimes not regarded as judicial acts. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988); but see Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 21 0-13 (2d Cir. 2009) (judge's decision on approval of public defender's vouchers is a judicial function); Davis v. Tarrant County, 565 F.3d 21 4, 226 (5th Cir.) , cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 624 (2009) (surveying cases and holding that judge's selection of applicants for court appointments is a judicial function).
6
1. (1) The need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation;
2. (2) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct;
3. (3) insulation from political influence;
4. (4) the importance of precedent;
5. (5) the adversary nature of the process; and
6. (6) the correctability of error on appeal.
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY
Accordingly , school board members who sit as adjudicators in student disciplinary proceedings, prison employ ees who decide prison disciplinary proceedings, and court reporters, the Court has held, do not enjoy absolute judicial immunity and may invoke only qualified immunity. Antoine v. Byers and Anderson Incorporated, 508 U.S. 429, 435-37 (1 993) (court reporters); Cleavenger, 474 U.S. at 203-06 (prison disciplinary committee members); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320-22 (1975) (school board members).
1. Nor do school board members sitting as adjudicators in proceedings relating to individual faculty employment decisions. Harris v. Victoria Independent School District, 168 F.3d 216, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1999); Stewart v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 908 F.2d 1499, 1507 -8 (11 th Cir. 1 990).
  1. Harris notes six factors relevant to ascertaining whether quasi judicial immunity attaches to a particular administrative proceeding:
    1. 6
      1. (1) The need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation;
      2. (2) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct;
      3. (3) insulation from political influence;
      4. (4) the importance of precedent;
      5. (5) the adversarial nature of the process; and
      6. (6) the correctability of error on appeal.
QUASI JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Because judicial immunity arises from the performance of an adjudicatory function, it extends to judicial or adjudicative acts within a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding whether or not the actor is a judge or an administrator.
Test to distinguish an administrative adjudicatory act entitled to judicial immunity from an ordinary administrative act entitled only to qualified immunity :
1. First, does a Board member, like a judge, perform a traditional “adjudicatory ” function, in that he decides facts, applies law, and otherwise resolv es disputes on the merits (free from direct political influence)?
2. Second, does a Board member, like a judge, decide cases sufficiently controversial that, in the absence of absolute immunity , he would be subject to numerous damages actions?
3. Third, does a Board member, like a judge, adjudicate disputes against a backdrop of multiple safeguards designed to protect a physician’s constitutional rights?
4. Watts, 97 8 F.2d at 2 8 (quoting Bettencourt v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 904 F.2d 772, 783 (1st Cir. 1990)).
STRATEGY ISSUES
Although cases creating judicial immunity bar a Section 1983 claim for damages, they do not bar a Section 1983 action for prospective injunctive relief or an award of attorney's fees under Section 1988. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
1. Congress, however, amended Section 1983 to forbid injunctive relief absent a violation of a declaratory decree or the unavailability of declaratory relief and, thus, effectively , if not formally , extended absolute judicial immunity to claims for injunctive relief. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-317, §309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996).
ACTING IN WHAT CAPACITY?
Relying on that language, several courts of appeals have further ex tended absolute immunity to the prosecutor’s investigation and collection of evidence once probable cause is established. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003); Herb Hallman Chevrolet Incorporated v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 643 (9th Cir. 1999).
PUBLIC DEFENDERS
1. CAPACITY
  1. Because public defenders do not act under color of law in representing individual clients, they may not be sued under Section 1 983; hence, the issue of absolute immunity never arises. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981).
    1. When a public defender acts in an administrative capacity rather than as representative of a client, she acts under color of law but is not performing a quasi-judicial function and is, therefore, entitled only to qualified immunity.
      1. Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 469- 0 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that public defender acted in administrative capacity and therefore was subject to suit for policy of withholding investigatory and legal resources from defendants who failed polygraph test and for policy of assigning inadequately trained, inexperienced attorneys to capital cases).
PERJURY IS FINE..
1. Although a prosecutor who suborns perjury at a criminal trial is absolutely immune, a prosecutor who manufactures false evidence does not enjoy absolute immunity. The former performs a prosecutorial function by presenting evidence, while the latter performs a police investigatory function by gathering evidence. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 27 3 (1 993).
  1. BUT NOT MANUFACTURING FALSE EVIDENCE
    1. The prosecutor who prepares and files an information and application for an arrest warrant enjoys absolute immunity for those actions . See Waggy v. Spokane County, 594 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 2010).
The Court’s decisions do not draw the line between performance of the investigatory function and the prosecutorial function with absolute clarity . Imbler v. Pachtman suggested that the inquiry begins with determining whether the prosecutor is performing a quasi-judicial function. A prosecutor obviously performs that function by trying a criminal case; hence, absolute immunity extended to the presentation of perjured testimony and the withholding of exculpatory evidence. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.34 (1976); Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (extending absolute immunity to prosecutor who fails to turn over exculpatory evidence discovered after sentencing); Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1 94) (prosecutor’s absolute immunity for withholding exculpatory evidence begins with arrest and continues through appeals); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 679 (9th Cir. 1984) (failure to preserve exculpatory evidence subject to absolute immunity ).
1. OVERVIEW
1. When absolute and qualified immunity limit individual capacity suits against public officials.
  1. Supreme Court, drawing on common law, created absolute immunity from liability for some government officials and qualified immunity for others. Absolute and qualified immunity were developed to protect officials from lawsuits for actions relating to their official duties.
    1. [T]he public interest requires decisions and actions to enforce laws for the protection of the public . . . . Public officials, whether governors, may ors or police, legislators or judges, who fail to make decisions when they are needed or who do not act to implement decisions when they are made do not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their offices. Implicit in the idea that officials ha e some immunity -- absolute or qualified -- for their acts, is a recognition that they may err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. Scheuer, 41 6 U.S. at 241 -42.
2. Section 1983 claims for damages involve suits against government employees who have violated the Constitution, statutes, or their employer’s own stated policies.
  1. 42 U.S.C. § 1 983 AUTHORIZES
    1. official capacity suits against state and local officials for structural injunctive relief
    2. claims against those officials in their individual capacity
      1. DAMAGES
      2. COMPENSATORY
      3. PUNITIVE
SECTION
1. 8.2.A. Absolute Immunity
  1. Absolute immunity bars any action against officials in the conduct of their office even for actions taken maliciously or in bad faith. Absolute immunity focuses on the governmental function being performed and the nature of the responsibilities of the official, not on the specific action taken. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1 998); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201 -02 (1985).
    1. In deciding whether officials performing a particular function are entitled to absolute immunity , courts generally look for a historical or common-law basis for the immunity in question. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 521 (1985); but see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976)
      1. With one exception, absolute immunity is restricted to those persons performing judicial or legislative functions.
SECTION
1. 8.2.A.1. Judicial Immunity
  1. The Supreme Court held in Stump v. Sparkman that judges have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damage actions for their “judicial” acts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
    1. COMMON LAW IMMUNITY OF JUDGES
      1. Court held that judicial immunity protects judges even when their judicial acts:
      2. exceed their jurisdiction, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Peia v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 2d 226, 235 (D. Conn. 2001).
      3. are done maliciously or corruptly, or Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; See also Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2005).
      4. are flawed by grave procedural error. Stump, 435 U.S. at 359.
      5. Court ruled that judicial immunity attaches only to the judicial acts of judges.
      6. NON-JUDICIAL ACTS; NON-JUDICIAL CAPACITY:
      7. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
      8. Four factors determine whether an act is judicial:
      9. (1 ) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function;
      10. (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge’s chambers;
      11. (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court, and
      12. (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a v isit to the judge in his official capacity .
  2. The Court permitted liability only for acts taken “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 . Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991 ); see also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 341 (1 Wall 1871 ).
    1. Absolute judicial immunity is justified in part because “the judicial process is largely self-correcting: procedural rules, appeals, and the possibility of collateral challenges obviate the need for damages actions to prevent unjust results.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 522 (1985). Absolute immunity was upheld in Stump, although these protections were unavailable to the sterilized plaintiff.
      1. Because of its focus on judicial acts, judicial immunity attaches to the judicial function, not the judicial office. If a court, individual judge, or prosecutor performs executive or legislative functions, immunity will be determined by the immunity applicable to the legislative or executive function performed. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Incorporated, 446 U.S. 719, 731 -34 (1980).
      2. In determining whether an individual performing administrative adjudicatory functions is entitled to absolute or only to qualified immunity , the Supreme Court identified several relevant factors: Cleavenger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978)).
SECTION
1. 8.2.A.2. Prosecutorial Immunity
  1. Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from damage liability for the initiation and prosecution of a criminal case.
    1. The Supreme Court, relying heavily on considerations of policy , reasoned that initiating a prosecution and presenting a case are activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force.”
      1. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423-24 (1976). Absolute immunity may also extend to government attorneys in non-criminal contexts. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 396-97 (2d Cir. 2006) (absolute immunity for state attorney general who declined to represent state employee in civil litigation against him).
  2. http://www.pubdef.state.mn.us/training/Past%20Programs/NACDL%2002-2009/Written/M.Moriarty/Recognizing_Pros_Misconduct.pdf
    1. http://www.mcaa-mn.org/docs/2010/Prosec%20Misc%20Article%20Revised%201-20-2010-with%20TOC.pdf
  3. JUDICIAL & PROSECUTOR IMMUNITY IS FUNCTIONAL
    1. ATTACHES ONLY TO ACTS INTIMATELY RELATED TO INITIATION & PROSECUTION OF A CRIMINAL CASE
      1. Struggling to define the boundaries of prosecutorial immunity , the Court held that a prosecutor who advised police officers on Fourth Amendment considerations in an ongoing criminal investigation performed an investigatory rather than a prosecutorial function and was, therefore, not entitled to absolute immunity. That same prosecutor, however, was entitled to absolute immunity for eliciting misleading testimony from those officers at a hearing on an application for a search warrant. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 47 8 (1991 ). Burns expressly declined to decide whether a prosecutor would be absolutely immune for maliciously seeking a warrant without probable cause; the Court limited its holding to conduct as an advocate during the probable-cause hearing.
      2. DISTINGUISH PURPOSE OF INDIVIDUAL ACTS: CAPACITY
      3. In a significant Ninth Circuit decision, the court distinguished between purposes for obtaining a material witness warrant: "when a prosecutor seeks a material witness warrant in order to investigate or peremptorily detain a suspect, rather than to secure his testimony at another's trial, the prosecutor is entitled at most to qualified, rather than absolute immunity ." Because conducting a press conference is not intimately associated with the judicial process, a prosecutor is not absolutely immune for statements made during a press conference. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir. 2009).
    2. See also Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 686-87 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Assistant United States Attorney not immune for participating in removal of grand jurors).
      1. Imbler and Kalina v. Fletcher extended absolute immunity to the initiation of a prosecution, and Imbler noted that “[p]reparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining ... of evidence.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33; Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997).
      2. Other courts have held that, before probable cause is established, an investigating prosecutor performs the role of police officer and is, therefore, not entitled to absolute immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 524 (1985) (attorney general not entitled to absolute immunity for ordering wiretaps as part of national security investigation since he was not acting in prosecutorial capacity ); Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97 , 103 (2d Cir. 1984) (prosecutor not entitled to absolute immunity “when a prosecutor engages in or authorizes and directs illegal wiretaps” and “the wiretapping is ... investigative in nature...”).
    3. Post conviction work performed by prosecutors is generally subject to absolute immunity, particularly when the prosecutor continues her work as an advocate. Warney v. Monroe County, 587 F.3d 1 1 3 (2d Cir. 2009) (absolute immunity extends to failure by prosecutor to disclose post conviction DNA test results promptly); Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11 th Cir. 2009).
      1. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein explained the boundary between prosecutorial and administrative functions and, in a sense, blurred them. In Goldstein, the plaintiff alleged that the district attorney and his chief assistant failed to adequately train line prosecutors on their duties to provide impeachment related information about prosecution witnesses to defense attorneys. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 1 29 S. Ct. 855 (2009).
      2. Although the claim was framed as a challenge to administrative procedure, the Court viewed it as dealing with the disclosure of information prior to trial which is "directly connected with the prosecutor's basic trial advocacy duties."
      3. The Court was unwilling to distinguish between cases of prosecutorial error at trial (to which absolute immunity attaches) and claims that such error was caused by inadequate training or insufficient information management systems, worried that claims of the former type could be easily recast as claims of the latter and usher in waves of litigation.
SECTION
1. 8.2.A.3. Witness Immunity
  1. With the exception of complaining witnesses who sign affidavits seeking the issuance of search or arrest warrants, witnesses in judicial proceedings are absolutely immune from suit arising from their testimony . Briscoe v. La Hue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983); Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268 (11 th Cir. 2010) (absolute immunity for grand jury witness, even if he knew testimony was false); Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 390 (6th Cir. 2009); Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2008) (absolute immunity extends to witnesses in arbitration hearings).
    1. This absolute immunity extends to suits arising from the witness grand jury testimony . Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012).
      1. Though often phrased as witness immunity , the immunity can best be understood as an incident of judicial immunity . Just as judicial immunity ex tends to prosecutors presenting a criminal case, so does it ex tend to witnesses testifying in judicial proceedings. Complaining witnesses who swear affidavits in support of arrest and search warrants are said not to be participants in judicial proceedings and, therefore, enjoy only qualified immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129-31 (1997) (prosecutor who signs affidavit seeking arrest warrant is entitled only to qualified immunity ); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 -45 (1986) (police officer who makes false statement or material omission to secure warrant enjoys only qualified immunity ).
      2. Similarly , witnesses in quasi judicial proceedings enjoy absolute immunity if the official conducting the proceeding enjoys absolute quasi judicial immunity. Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256 (11 th Cir. 2005) (extending absolute immunity to parole officer testifying before parole board whose members enjoy quasi judicial immunity ).
SECTION
1. 8.2.A.4. Legislative Immunity
  1. Members of Congress acting as legislators are absolutely immune from suits for either prospective relief or damages under the speech and debate clause of the U.S. Constitution. Eastland v. U.S. Serviceman’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 , 503 (1975).
    1. Speech-and-debate-clause immunity ensures that the legislative function may be performed independently without fear of outside interference. Because of its constitutional status, speech-and-debate clause immunity is broader in scope than common-law legislative immunity.
      1. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, not the motive of the actor.
      2. Legislators v oting to award bids or purchase property similarly performed administrative rather than legislative functions and were not sheltered by absolute immunity. Kamplain v. Curry County Board of Commissioners, 159 F.3d 1248, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, when a school board acts to expel students, or a city council fires a police chief, the school board members and city council members do not enjoy legislative immunity. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-321 (1975) (school board members cannot invoke absolute legislative or quasi judicial immunity for ex pulsion hearing); Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499 (11 th Cir. 1990) (school board members cannot invoke absolute immunity in personnel discharge matters); see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 662 (1980) (city liable for city council’s unconstitutional discharge of police chief).