DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION YOU MUST EXHAUST YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

CASE LAW; DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION
1. All circuits follow the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Zipes, infra, holding that the filing of a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. But some circuits have held that there is no subject matter jurisdiction where a plaintiff has failed to file an EEOC charge (as opposed to filing an untimely EEOC charge).
2. Supreme Court In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982), the Supreme Court explained: We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. (footnote omitted) The structure of Title VII, the congressional policy underlying it, and the reasoning of our cases all lead to this conclusion.
3. 2nd Circuit In Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 150 (2d Cir. 2003), the court explained: The requirement that a claim be first raised with the EEO office, however, is not a jurisdictional one. Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2000). As the Supreme Court has stated, "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is . . . a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); see also Briones v. Runyon, 101 F.3d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1996).
4. In addition, in Fernandez v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 45, 58 (2d Cir. 2006), the court explained: exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required if adequate remedies are not reasonably available. J.G. by Mrs. G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Rochester City Sch. Dist., 830 F.2d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 1987). Thus, courts may, in their discretion, waive administrative exhaustion requirements under circumstances where the administrative remedy is inadequate because the agency cannot provide effective relief. For instance, administrative remedies need not be pursued if "(a) '[the agency] lacks institutional competence to resolve the particular type of issue presented, such as the constitutionality of a statute'; (b) the challenge is to 'the adequacy of the agency procedure itself'; or (c) the agency 'lack[s] authority to grant the type of relief requested.'" Bastek v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 145 F.3d 90, 94 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146–48 (1992)).
5. 3rd Circuit In Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1999), the court explained: Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires that claims brought under Title VII be filed within ninety days of the claimant's receipt of the EEOC right to sue letter. This requirement has been treated by the courts as a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982).
6. 4th Circuit In Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2009), the Fourth Circuit held that "a failure by the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies concerning a Title VII claim deprives the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim." Id. at ___. The Court held that this applies to both Title VII and ADEA claims. With respect to Zipes, supra, the Court explained that the U.S. Supreme Court in Zipes "held only that the untimeliness of an administrative charge does not affect federal jurisdiction over a Title VII claim." Id. at ___ n. 2.
7. 5th Circuit In Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2006), the court explained that the Supreme Court has held that EEOC and EEO filing deadlines are not jurisdictional, but there is a disagreement in this circuit as to whether the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional: There is disagreement in this circuit on whether a Title- VII prerequisite, such as exhaustion, is merely a prerequisite to suit, and thus subject to waiver and estoppel, or whether it is a requirement that implicates subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that the EEOC or EEO filing deadlines are not jurisdictional. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1133(1982); Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58 (1990). See also Coke v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, 640 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Henderso v. United States Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1986). However, the reasoning in Zipes, which cites our en banc holding in Coke with approval, relies heavily on legislative history and Supreme Court precedents that characterize the filing deadlines as statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Henderson v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The filing deadlines are in the nature of statutes of limitations which are subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling."). Neither the Supreme Court nor this court sitting en banc has ruled that the exhaustion requirement is subject to waiver or estoppel, and our panels are in disagreement over that question. Compare Tolbert v. United States, 916 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is the well-settled law of this circuit that each [Title VII] requirement is a prerequisite to federal subject matter jurisdiction.") and Porter v. Adams, 639 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The exhaustion requirement . . . is an absolute prerequisite to suit") and Randel v. Dep't. of U.S. Navy, 157 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1998) ("If the claimant fails to comply with either of these [Title VII] requirements then the court is deprived of jurisdiction over the case.") with Young v. City of Houston, Tex., 906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1990) ("A failure of the EEOC prerequisite does not rob a court of jurisdiction.") and Fellows v. Universal Restaurants, Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 449N (5th Cir. 1983) ("The basic two statutory requirements (although these are not necessarily "jurisdictional") for a Title VII suit are . . . ."). Because neither party has a winning waiver or estoppel argument, we need not take sides in this dispute. Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788 n. 7.
8. 8th Circuit In Duncan v. Delta Consol. Industries, Inc., 371 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (8th Cir. 2004), the court explained the reasoning behind the exhaustion requirement: "In Title VII, Congress set up an elaborate administrative procedure, implemented through the EEOC, that is designed to assist in the investigation of claims of . . . discrimination in the workplace and to work towards the resolution of these claims through conciliation rather than litigation." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180-81 (1989) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). Title VII requires claimants to timely file a discrimination charge with the EEOC before he or she may bring a Title VII action in court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). It is generally recognized that "'[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies is central to Title VII's statutory scheme because it provides the EEOC the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to perform its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts.'" Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994)); see Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) ("By holding compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer."). "The proper exhaustion of administrative remedies gives the plaintiff a green light to bring her employment-discrimination claim . . . ." Shannon, 72 F.3d at 684. But see, Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 643-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) ("It is well-settled that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a private civil action under Title VII, and that the proper reach of a Title VII claim is a legal issue.").
9. 9th Circuit In Sommatino v. U.S., 255 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 2001), the court noted the Supreme Court decision of Zipes, but explained as follows: The Supreme Court has held that the failure to file a timely EEOC administrative complaint is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim, but is merely a statutory requirement subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). A number of our circuit cases have also held that the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII are not jurisdictional but are conditions precedent to filing an action which a defendant may waive or be estopped from asserting. Vinieratos v. United States, 939 F.2d 762, 768 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991); Stache v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1988); Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1172 9th Cir. 1986). However, our case law also holds that substantial compliance with the presentment of discrimination complaints to an appropriate administrative agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite. As we have explained, "[t]he jurisdictional scope of a Title VII claimant's court action depends upon the scope of both the EEOC charge and the EEOC investigation. " Paige v. State of California, 102 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994)). The district court has jurisdiction over any charges of discrimination that are "like or reasonably related " to the allegations in the EEOC charge, or that fall within the "EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected grow out the charge of discrimination." Deppe v. United Airlines, 217 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Yamaguchi v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997) and Farmer Bros., 31 F.3d at 899); accord Stache, 852 F.2d at 1234. Our cases also instruct that abandonment or failure to cooperate in the administrative process prevents exhaustion and precludes judicial review. See Greenlaw, 59 F.3d at 1000; Tanious v. IRS, 915 F.2d 410, 411 (9th Cir. 1990). In cases where a plaintiff has never presented a discrimination complaint to the appropriate administrative authority, we have held that the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. See Blank v. Donovan, 780 F.2d 808, (9th Cir. 1986); Scott v. Perry, 569 F.2d 1064, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 1978). Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 708 (emphasis in original and footnote omitted).
10. D.C. Circuit In Washington v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 160 F.3d 750, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the court explained: the administrative filing requirement is "not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court," and is, therefore, subject to equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
TIMELEY CHARGE FILED?
NOT A JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE TO SUIT
REQUIREMENT (LIKE S.O.L.)
SUBJECT TO
1. WAIVER
2. ESTOPPEL
3. EQUITABLE TOLLING
EXHASTION OF REMEDIES IS NOT REQUIRED IF ADEQUATE REMEDIES ARE NOT REASONABLY AVAILABLE
1. COURT MAY WAIVE REQUIREMENT WHERE
  1. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY IS INADEQUATE
    1. AGENCY CANNOT PROVIDE EFFECTIVE RELIEF
      1. a) '[the agency] lacks institutional competence to resolve the particular type of issue presented, such as the constitutionality of a statute
      2. b) the challenge is to 'the adequacy of the agency procedure itself
      3. c) the agency 'lack[s] authority to grant the type of relief requested
      4. SMACKAROONIE BABY; YOU CAN SAY THAT AGAIN
ELABORATE; LABORYNTH
1. It is generally recognized that "'[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies is central to Title VII's statutory scheme because it provides the EEOC the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to perform its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts.'" Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994)); see Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) ("By holding compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer."). "The proper exhaustion of administrative remedies gives the plaintiff a green light to bring her employment-discrimination claim . . . ." Shannon, 72 F.3d at 684.
PURPOSE & SCOPE
CONCILIATION v. LITIGATION
A number of our circuit cases have also held that the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII are not jurisdictional but are conditions precedent to filing an action which a defendant may waive or be estopped from asserting. Vinieratos v. United States, 939 F.2d 762, 768 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991); Stache v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1988); Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1172 9th Cir. 1986).
The district court has jurisdiction over any charges of discrimination that are "like or reasonably related " to the allegations in the EEOC charge, or that fall within the "EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected grow out the charge of discrimination." Deppe v. United Airlines, 217 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Yamaguchi v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997) and Farmer Bros., 31 F.3d at 899); accord Stache, 852 F.2d at 1234.
Our cases also instruct that abandonment or failure to cooperate in the administrative process prevents exhaustion and precludes judicial review. See Greenlaw, 59 F.3d at 1000; Tanious v. IRS, 915 F.2d 410, 411 (9th Cir. 1990).
PURPOSE & SCOPE
1. primary goal of preventing the courts from interfering while agencies develop a complete factual record, apply their expertise and discretion, and possibly resolve the conflict.
CORE TERMS
1. Adequate Remedy
2. Administrative Agencies
3. Administrative Procedures Act; APA
4. Exceptions
5. Excess of Authority
6. Exhaustion Doctrine
7. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
8. Interim Relief
9. Irreparable Injury
10. Judicial Review,
11. Appeal
12. Futility
13. Likely to Prevail on Merits
14. Stay of Execution
15. Waiver
16. ESTOPPEL
17. EQUITABLE TOLLING
18. HEREIN LIES
  1. FRAUD
  2. COERCION
  3. EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
  4. TRAFFICKING IN HUMANS
  5. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
  6. UNLAWFUL PRACTICES
  7. RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE
HURRY!! YOU HAVE 90 DAYS!!
STATUTORY SCHEME ?
E.E.O.C.
FIRST OPPORTUNITY
TITLE VII
INVESTIGATE
enables it to perform its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts
"By holding compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer."). "The proper exhaustion of administrative remedies gives the plaintiff a green light to bring her employment-discrimination claim . . . ." Shannon, 72 F.3d at 684.
NO!
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION; STUDY GUIDE #1; CASE LAW
1. By The Angry Jeweler; The Hennalady; Lisa Stinocher O'Hanlon http://angryjeweler.wix.com/write
  1. WARNING; MAY CONTAIN OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE
ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES MUST BE PURSUED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT BEFORE RESORT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WILL BE PERMITTED