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Concerned with the preliminary state of making ethical questions clear
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To answer "Is X good?" we must substitute for it a question which is free from ambiguity
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How must the defined meaning of "good" be related to its original meaning?
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It must be RELEVANT
- Those who have understood the definition must be able to say all that they want to say by using the term in the defined way
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INTEREST THEORIES
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"GOOD" defined in terms of APPROVAL or similar PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDES
- HOBBES: "good" means "desired by me"
- HUME: "good" means "approved by most people"
- COMMON OBJECTION: interest theories neglect the "vital" sense of "good"
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"VITAL" SENSE OF "GOOD": THREE REQUIREMENTS
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WE MUST BE ABLE TO SENSIBLY DISAGREE WHETHER SOMETHING IS "GOOD"
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RULES OUT HOBBES' DEFINITION
- "This is good" / " That isn't so, that's not good" translates into "I desire this" / "That isn't so, for I don't"
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"GOODNESS" MUST HAVE A "MAGNETISM": a person who recognizes X to be "good" must acquire a stronger tendency to act in its favor than otherwise it would have had
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RULES OUT HUME'S DEFINITION
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To recognize something as "good" is simply to recognize that the majority approve of it
- A man may see that the majority approve of X without having, himself, a stronger tendency to favor it
- This requirement EXCLUDES any attempt to define "good" in TERMS OF THE INTEREST OF PEOPLE OTHER THAN THE SPEAKER
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THE "GOODNESS" OF ANYTHING MUST NOT BE VERIFIABLE SOLELY BY THE USE OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
- RULES OUT ALL TRADITIONAL INTEREST THEORIES
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G.E.MOORE''S "OPEN QUESTION
- NO MATTER WHAT SET OF SCIENTIFICALLY KNOWABLE PROPERTIES A THING MAY HAVE, YOU WILL FIND, IN CAREFUL INTROSPECTION, THAT IT IS AN OPEN QUESTION WHETHER ANYTHING HAVING THESE PROPERTIES IS GOOD
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TRADITIONAL INTEREST THEORIES FAIL BECAUSE THEY PRESUPPOSE THAT ETHICAL STATEMENTS ARE DESCRIPTIVE OF THE EXISTING STATE OF INTERESTS, THAT THEY SIMPLY GIVE INFORMATION ABOUT INTERESTS
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THE MAJOR USE OF AN ETHICAL STATEMENT IS NOT TO INDICATE FACTS ABOUT PEOPLE'S INTERESTS, BUT TO CREATE AN INFLUENCE
- ETHICAL TERMS ARE INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE INTRICATE INTERPLAY AND READJUSTMENT OF HUMAN INTERESTS
- SOCIAL IS EXERTED, TO AN ENORMOUS EXTENT, BY MEANS THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH PHYSICAL FORCE OR MATERIAL REWARD
- HOW DOES AN ETHICAL TERM ACQUIRE ITS POWER OF INFLUENCING PEOPLE -WHY IT IS SUITED TO SUGGESTION?
- WHAT HAS THIS INFLUENCE TO DO WITH THE MEANING OF ETHICAL TERMS?
- DO THESE CONSIDERATIONS LEADS US TO A SENSE OF "GOOD" WHICH MEETS THE THREE REQUIREMENTS?
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QUESTION ABOUT MEANING
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TWO DIFFERENT PURPOSES IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE
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WE USE WORDS TO RECORD; CLARIFY AND COMMUNICATE BELIEFS
- DESCRIPTIVE
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WE USE WORDS TO VENT OUR FEELINGS (interjections), CREATE MOODS (poetry) OR TO INCITE PEOPLE TO ACTION OR ATTITUDES (oratory)
- DYNAMIC
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WHAT HAVE THE DYNAMIC USE OF WORDS TO DO WITH THEIR MEANING?
- WE MUST NOT DEFINE MEANING IN A WAY THAT WOULD MAKE MEANING VARY WITH DYNAMIC USAGE
- INSTEAD OF IDENTIFYING MEANING WITH ALL THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES AND EFFECTS THAT ATTEND A WORD'S UTTERANCE WE MUST IDENTIFY IT WITH THOSE THAT HAS A TENDENCY (CAUSAL PROPERTY, DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTY) TO BE CONNECTED WITH
- TENDENCY, THREE REQUIREMENTS
- IT MUST EXISTS FOR ALL WHO SPEAK THE LANGUAGE
- IT MUST BE PERSISTENT
- MUST BE REALIZABLE MORE OR LESS INDEPENDENTLY OF DETERMINATE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING A WORD'S UTTERANCE
- THERE IS A KIND OF MEANING; HOWEVER, WHICH HAS AN INTIMATE RELATION TO DYNAMIC USAGE
- THE EMOTIVE MEANING OF A WORD IS A TENDENCY OF A WORD, ARISING THROUGH THE HISTORY OF ITS USAGE, TO PRODUCE (RESULTS FROM) AFFECTIVE RESPONSES IN PEOPLE
- EMOTIVE MEANING
- WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN EMOTIVE MEANING AND THE DYNAMIC USE OF WORDS?
- THE MORE PRONOUNCED A WORD'S EMOTIVE MEANING IS, THE LESS LIKELY PEOPLE ARE TO USE IT PURELY DESCRIPTIVELY
- THE DISTINCTIONS DEPENDS SOLELY UPON THE PURPOSE OF THE SPEAKER
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THE MEANING OF "GOOD"
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ROUGHLY
- IT must be used not purely descriptively, but dynamically
- IT MUST BE USED TO PROMOTE A VERY SUBTLE KIND OF SUGGESTION
- IT MUST HAVE THE DYNAMIC USE OF LEADING THE HEARER TO MAKE TRUE WHAT IS SAID, RATHER THAN MERELY TO BELIEVE IT
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THE WORD 'GOOD' HAS A PLEASING EMOTIVE MEANING WHICH FITS IT ESPECIALLY FOR THE DYNAMIC USAGE OF SUGGESTING FAVORABLE INTEREST
- AN ETHICAL SENTENCE DIFFERS FROM AN IMPERATIVE IN THAT IT ENABLES ONE TO MAKE CHANGES IN A MORE SUBTLE, LESS FULLY CONSCIOUS WAY
- STRICTLY SPEAKING, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFINE 'GOOD' IN TERMS OF FAVORABLE INTEREST IF EMOTIVE MEANING IS NOT TO BE DISTORTED
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EMOTIVE MEANING & THE "VITAL" SENSE OF "GOOD"
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WE MUST DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DISAGREEMENT IN BELIEF AND DISAGREEMENT IN INTEREST
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A BELIEVES p AND B DISBELIEVES IT
- DISAGREEMENT IN BELIEF
- TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF INTEREST IN LEAVING OUT EMOTIVE MEANING GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ETHICAL JUDGMENTS ARE USED DESCRIPTIVELY ONLY
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A HAS A FAVORABLE INTEREST IN p, AND B HAS AN UNFAVORABLE ONE IN IT, AND NEITHER IS CONTENTED TO LET THE OTHER'S INTEREST REMAIN UNCHANGED
- DISAGREEMENT IN INTEREST
- THERE ARE NO DISAGREEMENT ABOUT INTEREST, ONLY DISAGREEMENT IN INTEREST
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"MAGNETISM", THE CONNECTION OF "GOODNESS" AND ACTIONS
- STEVENSON'S THEORY INCLUDE THE SPEAKER'S INTEREST, HENCE IS IMMUNE TO OBJECTION BASE ON THE SECOND REQUIREMENT
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CAN AN ETHICAL DISAGREEMENT BE RESOLVED THROUGH EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS, ASSUMING THAT EACH PERSON APPLIES THE EMPIRICAL METHOD EXHAUSTIVELY, CONSISTENTLY, AND WITHOUT ERROR?
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SOMETIMES, IT CAN
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DISAGREEMENT IN INTEREST MAY BE ROOTED IN DISAGREEMENT IN BELIEF
- PEOPLE WHO DISAGREE IN INTEREST WOULD OFTEN CEASE TO DO SO IF THEY KNEW THE PRECISE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE OBJECT OF THEIR INTEREST
- THE EMPIRICAL METHOD IS RELEVANT TO ETHICS SIMPLY BECAUSE OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD IS A DETERMINING FACT OF OUR INTERESTS
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IS THE EMPIRICAL METHOD SUFFICIENT FOR ATTAINING ETHICAL AGREEMENT? CLEARLY NOT
- EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE RESOLVES DISAGREEMENT IN INTEREST ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH DISAGREEMENT IS ROOTED IN DISAGREEMENT IN BELIEF
- OFTEN, THE ONLY WAY TO OBTAIN ETHICAL AGREEMENT, THROUGH PERSUASSION
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Stevenson's analysis of ethical judgment meet the three requirements for the "vital" sense of "good"
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Traditional interest theories fail to meet these requirements simply because they neglect emotive meaning
- This neglect leads them to neglect dynamic usage, and the sort of disagreement that results from such usage, together with the method of resolving the disagreement
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Answers Moore's objection about the "open question"
- Whatever scientifically knowable properties a thing may have, it is always an open question whether a thing having these enumerated qualities is good
- TO ASK WHETHER IS IT GOOD IS TO ASK FOR INFLUENCE
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Any sense of "good" which is expected both to unite itself in synthetic a priori fashion with other concepts, and to influence interest as well, is really a great confusion
- I EXTRACT FROM THESE MEANING THE POWER OF INFLUENCE ALONE WHICH I FIND THE ONLY INTELIGIBLE PART
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ETHICAL STATEMENTS ARE SOCIAL INSTRUMENTS
- THEY ARE USED IN A COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE IN WHICH WE ARE MUTUALLY ADJUSTING OURSELVES TO THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS