1. Concerned with the preliminary state of making ethical questions clear
    1. To answer "Is X good?" we must substitute for it a question which is free from ambiguity
      1. How must the defined meaning of "good" be related to its original meaning?
        1. It must be RELEVANT
          1. Those who have understood the definition must be able to say all that they want to say by using the term in the defined way
  2. INTEREST THEORIES
    1. "GOOD" defined in terms of APPROVAL or similar PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDES
      1. HOBBES: "good" means "desired by me"
      2. HUME: "good" means "approved by most people"
      3. COMMON OBJECTION: interest theories neglect the "vital" sense of "good"
  3. "VITAL" SENSE OF "GOOD": THREE REQUIREMENTS
    1. WE MUST BE ABLE TO SENSIBLY DISAGREE WHETHER SOMETHING IS "GOOD"
      1. RULES OUT HOBBES' DEFINITION
        1. "This is good" / " That isn't so, that's not good" translates into "I desire this" / "That isn't so, for I don't"
    2. "GOODNESS" MUST HAVE A "MAGNETISM": a person who recognizes X to be "good" must acquire a stronger tendency to act in its favor than otherwise it would have had
      1. RULES OUT HUME'S DEFINITION
        1. To recognize something as "good" is simply to recognize that the majority approve of it
          1. A man may see that the majority approve of X without having, himself, a stronger tendency to favor it
      2. This requirement EXCLUDES any attempt to define "good" in TERMS OF THE INTEREST OF PEOPLE OTHER THAN THE SPEAKER
    3. THE "GOODNESS" OF ANYTHING MUST NOT BE VERIFIABLE SOLELY BY THE USE OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
      1. RULES OUT ALL TRADITIONAL INTEREST THEORIES
      2. G.E.MOORE''S "OPEN QUESTION
        1. NO MATTER WHAT SET OF SCIENTIFICALLY KNOWABLE PROPERTIES A THING MAY HAVE, YOU WILL FIND, IN CAREFUL INTROSPECTION, THAT IT IS AN OPEN QUESTION WHETHER ANYTHING HAVING THESE PROPERTIES IS GOOD
    4. TRADITIONAL INTEREST THEORIES FAIL BECAUSE THEY PRESUPPOSE THAT ETHICAL STATEMENTS ARE DESCRIPTIVE OF THE EXISTING STATE OF INTERESTS, THAT THEY SIMPLY GIVE INFORMATION ABOUT INTERESTS
      1. THE MAJOR USE OF AN ETHICAL STATEMENT IS NOT TO INDICATE FACTS ABOUT PEOPLE'S INTERESTS, BUT TO CREATE AN INFLUENCE
        1. ETHICAL TERMS ARE INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE INTRICATE INTERPLAY AND READJUSTMENT OF HUMAN INTERESTS
        2. SOCIAL IS EXERTED, TO AN ENORMOUS EXTENT, BY MEANS THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH PHYSICAL FORCE OR MATERIAL REWARD
        3. HOW DOES AN ETHICAL TERM ACQUIRE ITS POWER OF INFLUENCING PEOPLE -WHY IT IS SUITED TO SUGGESTION?
        4. WHAT HAS THIS INFLUENCE TO DO WITH THE MEANING OF ETHICAL TERMS?
        5. DO THESE CONSIDERATIONS LEADS US TO A SENSE OF "GOOD" WHICH MEETS THE THREE REQUIREMENTS?
  4. QUESTION ABOUT MEANING
    1. TWO DIFFERENT PURPOSES IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE
      1. WE USE WORDS TO RECORD; CLARIFY AND COMMUNICATE BELIEFS
        1. DESCRIPTIVE
      2. WE USE WORDS TO VENT OUR FEELINGS (interjections), CREATE MOODS (poetry) OR TO INCITE PEOPLE TO ACTION OR ATTITUDES (oratory)
        1. DYNAMIC
        2. WHAT HAVE THE DYNAMIC USE OF WORDS TO DO WITH THEIR MEANING?
          1. WE MUST NOT DEFINE MEANING IN A WAY THAT WOULD MAKE MEANING VARY WITH DYNAMIC USAGE
          2. INSTEAD OF IDENTIFYING MEANING WITH ALL THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES AND EFFECTS THAT ATTEND A WORD'S UTTERANCE WE MUST IDENTIFY IT WITH THOSE THAT HAS A TENDENCY (CAUSAL PROPERTY, DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTY) TO BE CONNECTED WITH
          3. TENDENCY, THREE REQUIREMENTS
          4. IT MUST EXISTS FOR ALL WHO SPEAK THE LANGUAGE
          5. IT MUST BE PERSISTENT
          6. MUST BE REALIZABLE MORE OR LESS INDEPENDENTLY OF DETERMINATE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING A WORD'S UTTERANCE
          7. THERE IS A KIND OF MEANING; HOWEVER, WHICH HAS AN INTIMATE RELATION TO DYNAMIC USAGE
          8. THE EMOTIVE MEANING OF A WORD IS A TENDENCY OF A WORD, ARISING THROUGH THE HISTORY OF ITS USAGE, TO PRODUCE (RESULTS FROM) AFFECTIVE RESPONSES IN PEOPLE
          9. EMOTIVE MEANING
          10. WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN EMOTIVE MEANING AND THE DYNAMIC USE OF WORDS?
          11. THE MORE PRONOUNCED A WORD'S EMOTIVE MEANING IS, THE LESS LIKELY PEOPLE ARE TO USE IT PURELY DESCRIPTIVELY
      3. THE DISTINCTIONS DEPENDS SOLELY UPON THE PURPOSE OF THE SPEAKER
  5. THE MEANING OF "GOOD"
    1. ROUGHLY
      1. IT must be used not purely descriptively, but dynamically
      2. IT MUST BE USED TO PROMOTE A VERY SUBTLE KIND OF SUGGESTION
      3. IT MUST HAVE THE DYNAMIC USE OF LEADING THE HEARER TO MAKE TRUE WHAT IS SAID, RATHER THAN MERELY TO BELIEVE IT
    2. THE WORD 'GOOD' HAS A PLEASING EMOTIVE MEANING WHICH FITS IT ESPECIALLY FOR THE DYNAMIC USAGE OF SUGGESTING FAVORABLE INTEREST
      1. AN ETHICAL SENTENCE DIFFERS FROM AN IMPERATIVE IN THAT IT ENABLES ONE TO MAKE CHANGES IN A MORE SUBTLE, LESS FULLY CONSCIOUS WAY
      2. STRICTLY SPEAKING, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFINE 'GOOD' IN TERMS OF FAVORABLE INTEREST IF EMOTIVE MEANING IS NOT TO BE DISTORTED
  6. EMOTIVE MEANING & THE "VITAL" SENSE OF "GOOD"
    1. WE MUST DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DISAGREEMENT IN BELIEF AND DISAGREEMENT IN INTEREST
      1. A BELIEVES p AND B DISBELIEVES IT
        1. DISAGREEMENT IN BELIEF
        2. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF INTEREST IN LEAVING OUT EMOTIVE MEANING GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ETHICAL JUDGMENTS ARE USED DESCRIPTIVELY ONLY
      2. A HAS A FAVORABLE INTEREST IN p, AND B HAS AN UNFAVORABLE ONE IN IT, AND NEITHER IS CONTENTED TO LET THE OTHER'S INTEREST REMAIN UNCHANGED
        1. DISAGREEMENT IN INTEREST
        2. THERE ARE NO DISAGREEMENT ABOUT INTEREST, ONLY DISAGREEMENT IN INTEREST
    2. "MAGNETISM", THE CONNECTION OF "GOODNESS" AND ACTIONS
      1. STEVENSON'S THEORY INCLUDE THE SPEAKER'S INTEREST, HENCE IS IMMUNE TO OBJECTION BASE ON THE SECOND REQUIREMENT
    3. CAN AN ETHICAL DISAGREEMENT BE RESOLVED THROUGH EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS, ASSUMING THAT EACH PERSON APPLIES THE EMPIRICAL METHOD EXHAUSTIVELY, CONSISTENTLY, AND WITHOUT ERROR?
      1. SOMETIMES, IT CAN
        1. DISAGREEMENT IN INTEREST MAY BE ROOTED IN DISAGREEMENT IN BELIEF
          1. PEOPLE WHO DISAGREE IN INTEREST WOULD OFTEN CEASE TO DO SO IF THEY KNEW THE PRECISE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE OBJECT OF THEIR INTEREST
        2. THE EMPIRICAL METHOD IS RELEVANT TO ETHICS SIMPLY BECAUSE OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD IS A DETERMINING FACT OF OUR INTERESTS
      2. IS THE EMPIRICAL METHOD SUFFICIENT FOR ATTAINING ETHICAL AGREEMENT? CLEARLY NOT
        1. EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE RESOLVES DISAGREEMENT IN INTEREST ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH DISAGREEMENT IS ROOTED IN DISAGREEMENT IN BELIEF
        2. OFTEN, THE ONLY WAY TO OBTAIN ETHICAL AGREEMENT, THROUGH PERSUASSION
  7. Stevenson's analysis of ethical judgment meet the three requirements for the "vital" sense of "good"
    1. Traditional interest theories fail to meet these requirements simply because they neglect emotive meaning
      1. This neglect leads them to neglect dynamic usage, and the sort of disagreement that results from such usage, together with the method of resolving the disagreement
    2. Answers Moore's objection about the "open question"
      1. Whatever scientifically knowable properties a thing may have, it is always an open question whether a thing having these enumerated qualities is good
      2. TO ASK WHETHER IS IT GOOD IS TO ASK FOR INFLUENCE
    3. Any sense of "good" which is expected both to unite itself in synthetic a priori fashion with other concepts, and to influence interest as well, is really a great confusion
      1. I EXTRACT FROM THESE MEANING THE POWER OF INFLUENCE ALONE WHICH I FIND THE ONLY INTELIGIBLE PART
    4. ETHICAL STATEMENTS ARE SOCIAL INSTRUMENTS
      1. THEY ARE USED IN A COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE IN WHICH WE ARE MUTUALLY ADJUSTING OURSELVES TO THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS