CHARACTERISTICS
HIGH CONCENTRATION
FEW firms
dominate significant portion of M
exercise M power
mutually independant
consider actions of rival
HOMOGENOUS / DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS
standardised
soft drink
Pepsi vs Coca-cola
mobile carrier
vina, viettel, and mobifone...
differentiated
phone manufacturer
Nokia, HTC, Samsung
HIGH BARRIER TO ENTRY
economies of scale
LRAC
a typical firm won't reach the minimum point on its LRAC
until it has produced a large Q of industry sales
have room for few firms
government-imposed barrier
employ lobbyist
convince legislators
pass laws favorable to the economic interests
patents
DEF
encourage research & develope
improved product
efficient production approach
during years patents are in force
charge high P
economic P
barriers to international trade
tariff
quota
on FOREIGN COMPETITION
occupation licensing
restrict numbers of people with license
raise P
ownership -> key input
eg: De Beers Company
control the output of most of the world's dismond mines
COMPETITION
Merger
greater power
manipulate Rs suppliers
Non-price
NOTIONS
distinguished products based on attributes
goods
craftmanship
product innovation
service
advertising
promotion
discounts
different price schemes
distribution
customer focus
BENEFITS
more profitable than lower P
avoid P wars
collusions
fixed high price
restrict the quantity
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
GAME THEORY
DEFINITION
a framework analysing chosen strategies
BASE
assumptions made about rivals’ strategies
pricing
advertising
product range
customer groups
ELEMENTS
set of PLAYERS
set of INDEPENDANT STRATEGIES
PAY-OFF for each combination of strategies
DOMINANT STRATEGY
JETSTAR strategy
VA sets high P
Jetstar low P
VN sets low P
Jetstar low P
VA strategy
J sets high P
VA low P
J sets low P
VA low P
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
the point where firms doing the best it can given the others’ strategies.
low P
low P
MAXIMIN STRATEGY
pay-off
the profit for pursueing strategy
DEF
maximise the minimum pay-off
risk of the firm
compare the risk
better minimum pay-off
COLLUSION
PARETO OPTIMUM
where both firms cooperate => increase mutual pay-off
example
dominant strategy
nash equilibrium
maximin strategy
collusion
COLLUSION
uncertainty
inability to predict strategies of rivals
virtually impossible to predict
DC
MR
COLLUSIVE PRICING MODEL
SECRET agreement
fix price
divide up/share the market
restricting competition among themselves
INCENTIVES
Remove uncertainty
Avoid price war
Increase profits
Hinder new entrants
OBSTACLES
differents costs
differentated products
number of firms
cheating
recession
legal obstacles
collusion is ILLEGAL
CARTEL
coordinate
fixed O
total industry outputs
allocation
customers
territory
market shares
occurs when
small numbers of oligopolists
homogenous products
OUTCOME
increase individual members' profits
very close to monopoly
act TOGETHER rather than COMPETE
PRICE LEADERSHIP MODEL
TACIT COLLUSION
behavious coordination w/o an explicit agreement
DOMINANT FIRM
def
the most efficient, oldest, most respected, largest
other follows
changes the price
OUTCOMES
P doesn't change often
P changes public
P is a barrier to entry
EoS
EFFICIENCY
COLLUSION CASE
Productive inefficiency
P > min ATC
Allocative inefficiency
P # MC
POSITIVE COMPETITION
EoS
Competition
improve in product quality
innovative
technology advance