1. Philosophy
   1. study of the structures of experience and consciousness
   2. should not be considered as a unitary movement
   3. study phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness
   4. differentiated from the Cartesian method of analysis
   5. seeks through systematic reflection to determine the essential properties and structures of experience
   6. assumptions
      1. rejects the concept of objective research
         1. groups assumptions through phenomenological epoche
      2. analyzing daily human behavior can provide one with a greater understanding of nature
      3. persons, not individuals, should be explored
         1. understood through the unique ways they reflect the society they live in
      4. gather “capta,” or conscious experience, rather than traditional data
      5. oriented on discovery
         1. methods that are far less restricting than in other sciences
   7. in essence, anti-reductionistic
      1. reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness
      2. not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions
   8. direct reaction to the psychologism and physicalism of Husserl's time
   9. rejects the rationalist bias that has dominated Western thought since Plato
   10. method of reflective attentiveness that discloses the individual’s “lived experience.”
   11. Loosely rooted in an epistemological device, with Sceptic roots, called epoché
   12. method entails the suspension of judgment while relying on the intuitive grasp of knowledge, free of presuppositions and intellectualizing
   13. “science of experience,”
   14. momentarily erase the world of speculation by returning the subject to his or her primordial experience of the matter
   15. suspension of belief in what we ordinarily take for granted or infer by conjecture diminishes the power of what we customarily embrace as objective reality
   16. Husserl
       1. humans as having been constituted by states of consciousness
   17. Heidegger
       1. consciousness is peripheral to the primacy of one’s existence (i.e., the mode of being of Dasein)
       2. which cannot be reduced to one’s consciousness of it
       3. one’s state of mind is an “effect” rather than a determinant of existence
2. People
   1. Edmund Husserl
      1. founder
   2. Martin Heidegger
   3. Edith Stein
   4. Nicolai Hartmann
   5. Gabriel Marcel
   6. Maurice Merleau-Ponty
   7. Jean-Paul Sartre
   8. Max Scheler
   9. Paul Ricoeur
   10. Jean-Luc Marion
   11. Emmanuel Lévinas
   12. Alfred Schütz
   13. Eric Voegelin
3. terms
   1. intentionality
      1. "aboutness"
      2. consciousness is always consciousness of something
      3. intentional object
         1. object of consciousness
         2. perception, memory, retention and protention, signification, etc
      4. alternative to the representational theory of consciousness
         1. reality cannot be grasped directly because it is available only through perceptions of reality that are representations of it in the mind (rep theory)
         2. (Husserl) consciousness is not “in” the mind but rather conscious of something other than itself (the intentional object)
         3. whether the object is a substance or a figment of imagination
      5. playing on the etymological roots
         1. "stretching out"
            1. consciousness "stretching out" towards its object
      6. consciousness occurs as the simultaneity of a conscious act and its object
      7. direct perception or in fantasy is inconsequential to the concept of intentionality itself
      8. whatever consciousness is directed at, that is what consciousness is conscious of
      9. doesn't have to be a physical object apprehended in perception: it can just as well be a fantasy or a memory
      10. "structures" of consciousness, i.e., perception, memory, fantasy, etc., are called intentionalities
   2. Intuition
      1. where the intentional object is directly present to the intentionality at play
      2. if the intention is "filled" by the direct apprehension of the object, you have an intuited object
      3. If you do not have the object as referred to directly, the object is not intuited, but still intended, but then emptily
      4. empty intentions
         1. signitive intentions - intentions that only imply or refer to their objects
   3. Evidence
      1. "subjective achievement of truth."
      2. having something present in intuition with the addition of having it present as intelligible
      3. successful presentation of an intelligible object
      4. successful presentation of something whose truth becomes manifest in the evidencing itself
   4. Noesis
      1. the real content of an intentional act (an act of consciousness)
      2. the part of the act that gives it a particular sense or character
      3. judging or perceiving something
      4. loving or hating something
      5. accepting or rejecting it, etc.
   5. Noema
      1. the ideal content of an intentional act (an act of consciousness)
      2. a complex ideal structure comprising at least
         1. a noematic sense
            1. the ideal meaning of the act
         2. a noematic core
            1. the act's referent or object as it is meant in the act
   6. Empathy and intersubjectivity
      1. the experience of one's own body as another
      2. requires that we focus on the subjectivity of the other, as well as our intersubjective engagement with them
      3. apperception built on the experiences of your own lived-body
      4. lived body is your own body as experienced by yourself, as yourself
      5. allows for the possibility of changing your point of view
      6. making the absent present and the present absent
      7. body is also experienced as a duality, both as object (you can touch your own hand) and as your own subjectivity (you experience being touched)
      8. experience of your own body as your own subjectivity is then applied to the experience of another's body
      9. through apperception, is constituted as another subjectivity
      10. intersubjectivity constitutes objectivity
      11. what you experience as objective is experienced as being intersubjectively available - available to all other subjects
      12. one also experiences oneself as being a subject among other subjects
      13. and one experiences oneself as existing objectively for these Others
      14. oneself as the noema of Others' noeses
      15. or as a subject in another's empathic experience
      16. Intersubjectivity is also a part in the constitution of one's lifeworld, especially as "homeworld."
   7. Lifeworld
      1. the "world" each one of us lives in
      2. the "background" or "horizon" of all experience
      3. that on which each object stands out as itself (as different) and with the meaning it can only hold for us
      4. is both personal and intersubjective (it is then called a "homeworld")
      5. does not enclose each one of us in a solus ipse
   8. Transcendental phenomenology
      1. distinction between the act of consciousness (noesis) and the phenomena at which it is directed (the noemata)
      2. "noetic"
         1. the intentional act of consciousness
         2. believing, willing, etc.
      3. "noematic"
         1. the object or content (noema), which appears in the noetic acts
         2. the believed, wanted, hated, and loved ...
      4. What we observe is not the object as it is in itself, but how and inasmuch it is given in the intentional acts
      5. epoché
      6. pure transcendental ego, as opposed to the concrete empirical ego
      7. the study of the essential structures that are left in pure consciousness
      8. study of the noemata and the relations among them
      9. Oskar Becker
      10. Aron Gurwitsch
      11. Alfred Schutz
   9. Realist phenomenology
      1. group distanced themselves from his new transcendental phenomenology
      2. preferred the earlier realist phenomenology of the first edition of the Logical Investigations
      3. Adolf Reinach
      4. Alexander Pfänder
      5. Johannes Daubert
      6. Max Scheler
      7. Roman Ingarden
      8. Nicolai Hartmann
      9. Dietrich von Hildebrand
   10. Existential phenomenology
       1. rejection of the transcendental ego
       2. objects to the ego's transcendence of the world
       3. leaves the world spread out and completely transparent before the conscious
   11. Eastern thought
       1. some resonance with with Zen Buddhism and Taoism
       2. Dasein
          1. possibly inspired by Okakura Kakuzo's concept of das-in-der-Welt-sein (being in the world)
          2. The Book of Tea
       3. Early Islamic philosophy
          1. Lebanese philosopher Nader El-Bizri
       4. French Orientalist and philosopher Henri Corbin
       5. Jim Ruddy
          1. combined
             1. Transcendental Ego
             2. Husserl
             3. primacy of self-consciousness
             4. Sankaracharya
          2. "convergent phenomenology."
          3. relation-like, rather than merely thing-like, or "intentional" objectivity"
   12. Technoethics
       1. Phenomenological approach
          1. impact view’ of technology
          2. constructivist view of the technology/society relationships
          3. posit technology and society as if speaking about the one does not immediately and already draw upon the other for its ongoing sense or meaning
          4. society and technology co-constitute each other
          5. they are each other's ongoing condition, or possibility for being what they are
          6. the artifact already emerges from a prior ‘technological’ attitude towards the world
          7. valid but not adequate
       2. Heidegger’s approach
          1. pre-technological age
          2. the essence of technology is the way of being of modern humans
          3. sees the world as something to be ordered and shaped in line with projects, intentions and desires
          4. a ‘will to power’ that manifests itself as a ‘will to technology'
       3. Hubert Dreyfus approach
          1. contemporary society
          2. he way skill development has become understood in the past has been wrong
          3. what we observe when we learn a new skill in everyday practice is in fact the opposite
          4. most often start with explicit rules or preformulated approaches and then move to a multiplicity of particular cases, as we become an expert
          5. humans as beings that are always already situated in-the-world
          6. the intricate expertise of everyday activity is forgotten and taken for granted by AI as an assumed starting point
          7. If we are to understand technology we need to ‘return’ to the horizon of meaning that made it show up as the artifacts we need, want and desire
          8. need to consider how these technologies reveal (or disclose) us.